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Abstract 
International tax competition undermines states’ capacity for redistributive taxation. It is thus 
problematic from the point of view of both cosmopolitan and internationalist theories of 
justice. This paper examines the proposal of a fiscal policy constraint that prohibits tax 
policies if they are strategically motivated and harmful to effective fiscal self-determination 
internationally. I argue that we should opt for a more robust, preference-independent 
mechanism to prevent harmful tax competition instead. States should, as a matter of justice, 
accept global minimum tax rates on mobile tax bases. 
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1. Introduction 
Justice in taxation was long considered a quintessentially domestic topic: Whatever the 
demands of justice in this area may be, they apply separately to individual states, considered 
in isolation from each other (cf. Rawls, 1971: 8; Murphy and Nagel, 2002: 41). Under 
conditions of economic globalization, this assumption has increasingly become untenable. 
Even if we assume that the power to tax falls squarely in the hands of individual states and 
disregard proposals for taxes to be raised at an international level,1 the fact that parts of the 
tax base are mobile across borders gives rise to questions of justice with an international reach 
(Brock, 2008; Ronzoni, 2009, 2014, 2016; Dietsch and Rixen, 2014a, 2014b; Dietsch 2015). 
Unhampered tax competition is problematic from the perspective of both cosmopolitan and 
internationalist theories of justice. According to cosmopolitanism, principles of distributive 
justice apply directly beyond state borders. On this view, international tax competition is 
worrying insofar as it leads to an unjust distribution of wealth (or some other currency of 
distributive justice) between individuals worldwide. According to internationalism, the scope 
of distributive justice between individuals is limited to the domestic context. However, there 
are international duties of justice to secure background conditions that enable states to realize 
just institutions domestically and entertain fair relations among themselves (Ronzoni, 2009). 
From an internationalist perspective, international tax competition is worrying to the extent 
that it undermines the effective fiscal self-determination2 of states or leads to a level of 
inequality between states that is incompatible with fair international relations (Dietsch and 
Rixen, 2014b; Ronzoni 2014, 2016). 
This paper argues that both cosmopolitans and internationalists have reason to support global 
minimum tax rates to mitigate the harmful effects of international tax competition. It is 
organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the mechanisms and effects of 
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international tax competition. Section 3 discusses the normative grounds for seeing it as a 
problem of justice. Section 4 introduces two normative principles put forward by Peter 
Dietsch and Thomas Rixen (2014b) to address the problem of harmful tax competition. 
Section 5 criticizes their ‘fiscal policy constraint’ which asymmetrically restrains the option 
space of different countries depending on their non-strategic tax preferences. Section 6 
introduces global minimum tax rates as a more robust, preference-independent mechanism to 
counteract downward pressure on the taxation of mobile tax bases. Section 7 discusses how 
the minimum tax rate should be set on various versions of cosmopolitanism and 
internationalism. Section 8 addresses the worry that global minimum tax rates might harm 
low-income countries that may have nothing but low tax rates to compete for capital on the 
global financial markets. Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. The mechanisms and effects of international tax competition 
Tax competition is a contested issue not only in normative theory, but also in the economic 
literature. This section gives a short overview of (a.) theoretical models of tax competition 
discussed in public economics, (b.) the strategies employed to lower the tax burden on capital 
in practice, and (c.) the effects of tax competition on the ability of states to raise taxes on 
mobile tax bases. 
 
a. Theoretical models of tax competition 
Tax competition occurs when jurisdictions strategically set their tax policies to attract a 
mobile tax base (Wilson and Wildasin, 2004). Not everybody agrees that such competition is 
problematic. Some think, quite to the contrary, that it enhances efficiency. One influential line 
of argument to this effect was first introduced by Charles Tiebout (1956) in the context of tax 
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competition between subnational jurisdictions. Tiebout believes that tax competition is a 
solution to the problem that there is no market for public goods. His model predicts that the 
possibility to ‘vote with one’s feet’ (Hirschman, 1970) and move to another jurisdiction where 
the bundle of public goods provision and tax burden is more to one’s liking will ultimately 
lead to policies that more adequately reflect the preferences of the population.  
However, it is important to note the limitations of the Tiebout model. First, it starts from the 
assumption that taxes are raised exclusively to supply public goods, and that the taxes paid by 
an individual roughly equal the costs of supplying her with those goods. Second, the model 
assumes that all taxpayers are perfectly mobile across jurisdictions at no considerable cost. 
Contrary to the first assumption, virtually all jurisdictions practice some kind of redistributive 
taxation, and according to most theories of justice, they should do so. Contrary to the second 
assumption, while capital is highly mobile across jurisdictions, this is much less true for 
persons, especially in the international case. States typically have legal restrictions on 
immigration in place, which are informed in part by the way immigration affects 
redistributive taxation (net taxpayers are generally more welcome than those creating net 
costs). While the moral justifiability of a right to exclude would-be immigrants is up for 
debate (Carens, 1987, 2013; Cassee, 2016), restrictions on immigration are a part of the 
present situation that should not be ignored. And even where no legal restrictions apply, 
migrating to another jurisdiction is typically a costly process, both in monetary terms and in 
terms of giving up personal relationships. 
These shortcomings of the Tiebout model raise suspicion that, far from making governments 
more responsive to all taxpayers’ preferences, tax competition will lead to a ‘race to the 
bottom’ with regard to the taxation of capital. This suspicion is substantiated by a model of 
capital tax competition originally developed by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). The model 
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assumes a fixed global capital stock that is perfectly mobile across a number of identical 
jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction individually fixes its rate of capital taxation and uses the tax 
revenue to purchase a single public good (like the Tiebout model, the Zodrow/Mieszkowski 
model does not take into account redistributive taxation). Capital after tax is used to produce a 
single private good. States optimize their tax rates so as to best satisfy the preferences of a 
representative consumer for private and public goods. Under these assumptions, tax setting by 
individual jurisdictions takes the form of a prisoner’s dilemma. Each jurisdiction will 
rationally choose a tax rate that is lower than the optimal tax rate from an aggregate point of 
view. 
The prediction of lower than optimal taxation is relatively robust, with some qualifications, 
for a number of changes to the model (for an overview, see Keen and Konrad, 2013; 
Clausing, 2016). A model that takes into account public spending in infrastructure for 
business and redistributive transfers indicates that spending in public infrastructure may be 
higher than optimal in a situation of tax competition, while redistributive transfers will be 
lower (Sørensen, 2004). In an asymmetric case with countries of different sizes, smaller 
countries will have stronger incentives to become tax havens, as the influx of foreign capital 
is comparatively more relevant for them than the reduction of tax revenue from capital 
already present in the country (Bucovetsky, 1991). The setting of capital tax rates, in this 
case, takes the form of an ‘asymmetric prisoner’s dilemma’, where some jurisdictions benefit 
from the lack of coordination, though coordination could still be a Pareto improvement if 
side-payments were allowed (Rixen, 2008: ch. 3). Finally, a model that takes into account 
agglomeration effects shows that core states can hold on to mobile production factors even if 
their tax rates are somewhat higher than those in the periphery (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004). 
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b. Tax evasion and tax avoidance in practice 
The basic model of capital tax competition introduced in the last section and most of its 
extensions focus on a scenario where there is only one tax on capital, raised uniformly (but at 
different rates) by all jurisdictions, and there is only one way to lower the tax burden, namely 
by investing capital in a jurisdiction with a lower tax rate.3 
In practice, capital taxation takes different forms. Corporate taxes typically make for around 
one third of the overall tax revenue on capital, with personal taxes on capital income and 
property accounting for the remaining two thirds (Zucman, 2014). Physically moving 
business operations or changing residence to a jurisdiction with lower tax rates is not the only, 
nor the most important, strategy employed to lower the tax burden in either case.  
In the realm of personal taxation, there is a considerable amount of illegal tax evasion by 
wealthy individuals who hide taxable portfolio capital in tax havens that do not inform the 
country of origin about its existence. According to one estimate, at least eight percent of 
privately owned financial assets worldwide are stashed away in tax havens (Zucman, 2013).  
On the corporate side, a whole range of strategies of tax avoidance are employed (de Mooij 
and Ederveen, 2008). First, corporations reduce their tax burden by shifting profits to 
subsidiaries in jurisdictions with low or zero corporate taxation. For example, a 
multinational’s subsidiary in a high-tax jurisdiction may reduce its profits on paper by paying 
exaggerated royalties for intellectual property to another subsidiary in a low-tax environment. 
Second, many jurisdictions grant preferential taxation to specific corporate bodies, thus giving 
companies an opportunity to lower their tax burden by adjusting their legal form. Third, a 
company’s financial structure may also help to reduce its tax burden, as interest on debt is 
deductible from the corporate tax base as a cost. The combination of these strategies often 
gives rise to corporate structures of nearly comical complexity.4 
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c. The effects of tax competition 
In the light of these strategies employed by corporations and wealthy individuals, states 
engage not only in ‘real’ tax competition for foreign direct investment and wealthy residents, 
but also in various forms of ‘virtual’ tax competition, where the relocation of tax base is not 
accompanied by a real change in where economic activity takes place or a person resides 
(Dietsch and Rixen, 2014b). Empirical evidence suggests that profit shifting, rather than 
competition for foreign direct investment, is the main driving force behind the global trend for 
lower statutory corporate tax rates (de Mooij and Ederveen, 2008). The OECD average 
statutory corporate tax rate at the central government level has declined from 41% in 1981 to 
23% in 2014 (Clausing, 2016).5 In the same time period, there was also a widespread demise 
of inheritance taxation, as well as a reduction in top marginal rates of personal income 
taxation. The latter of these developments can be seen as a side-effect of lower corporate 
income taxes: If personal income were taxed at a much higher rate than corporate income, 
high-income individuals would have an incentive to avoid personal taxation by incorporating 
(Rixen, 2016). 
As noted above, tax competition produces winners as well as losers, and for some winners 
(especially small OECD countries, but also some tax havens outside the OECD), the gain in 
tax base may outweigh the arithmetical effect of lower tax rates, so that their tax revenue 
increases overall (Genschel and Seelkopf, 2016). For many other countries, however, tax 
competition has resulted in a diminished ability to raise tax revenue on capital.  
For high-income countries, the main effect of tax competition is likely a shift of the tax 
burden towards less mobile factors such as labor income and consumption (Clausing, 2016). 
The result of tax competition, in these cases, is not so much an undersupply of public goods 
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as a reduction of the part of the tax burden that is carried by those at the top of the 
distribution. Low-income countries, on the other hand, have often been unable to make up for 
their losses in corporate tax revenue, partly because they lack the institutional capacity to 
raise other kinds of taxes (Dietsch and Rixen, 2014b: 156). While OECD countries typically 
have a total tax revenue in the range of 30% to 40% of GDP, it is between 10% and 20% for 
developing countries. Tax avoidance through transfer pricing is at least part of the explanation 
why (European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 2014). 
 
3. A problem of justice? 
To take stock of the discussion in the last section, there is evidence that international tax 
competition substantially hampers the ability of states to raise tax revenue on capital. For 
high-income states, the result is a shift of the tax burden towards less mobile tax bases, thus 
diminishing the part of the tax burden borne by those at the top of the distribution. Low-
income states, on the other hand, may have no choice but to shrink their budget substantially. 
For them, it is not only redistributive taxation that becomes more difficult, but taxation tout 
court. 
Not all normative theorists will agree that this situation amounts to an injustice. Right 
libertarians may welcome the fact that tax competition impedes redistributive policies, which 
they take to be unjust in the first place (e.g. Nozick, 1974). Statists will claim that the scope of 
distributive justice is firmly limited to the domestic arena and demands for global justice in 
distributive matters are misguided (e.g. Nagel, 2005). I will not engage with these views in 
this article. Instead, I will simply assume that they are mistaken. This still leaves ample room 
for different normative background assumptions. Importantly, both cosmopolitan and 
  9 
internationalist theorists have reason to see international tax competition as a problem of 
justice (Ronzoni, 2014, 2016). 
According to the kind of cosmopolitanism I am concerned with here, the demands of 
distributive justice apply, at least under conditions of a globalized economy, beyond state 
borders (Beitz, 1979; Pogge, 1994). What is problematic about international tax competition, 
on this view, is its effect on the global distribution of wealth, basic goods, welfare, or some 
other currency of distributive justice among individuals (call this the ‘individualist equality’ 
motive for action against harmful tax competition).  
Internationalists, on the other hand, agree with statists that the demands of individualist 
distributive justice are restricted to the domestic context. The main subjects in the 
international arena are states rather than individuals, and an unequal distribution between 
individuals in different states is not problematic per se. However, what differentiates 
internationalists from statists is that they accept demands of background justice to secure 
conditions that enable all states to be functioning self-determining polities and to interact with 
each other as free and equal (Ronzoni 2009, 2014, 2016).6 Importantly, the self-determination 
of states is understood to entail not only freedom from external intervention, but also 
substantive abilities to solve their own problems, on their own terms. (This is often referred to 
as ‘effective self-determination’ or ‘effective sovereignty’.)  
On the internationalist view, tax competition is problematic mainly because it undermines 
effective self-determination in its fiscal dimension, i.e. the ability of states to effectively affect 
parameters of their domestic economies through their fiscal policies. Additionally, 
internationalists may also be concerned about the impact of tax competition on inequalities 
between states, as such inequalities may facilitate domination of one state by another, thus 
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undermining the fairness of international relations. (Call these the ‘fiscal self-determination’ 
and ‘inter-state equality’ motives for action against harmful tax competition.) 
I will not try to defend either the cosmopolitan or the internationalist view here. Instead, I will 
argue that a case can be made on both views for a robust institutional mechanism to prevent 
harmful tax competition. While the details of the preferred solution will likely depend on 
whether one accepts the cosmopolitan or the internationalist picture, there is also a large 
amount of convergence. 
 
4. The membership principle and the fiscal policy constraint 
To make the case for a robust institutional solution to the problem of harmful tax competition, 
it may be helpful to contrast my own view with the position of Dietsch and Rixen (2014b; for 
a more comprehensive defense, see Dietsch, 2015), who offer probably the most nuanced 
philosophical treatment of international tax competition to date. Relying mainly on the fiscal 
self-determination motive and with the ambition to remain neutral between competing 
substantive theories of distributive justice, they propose two side constraints on national tax 
policies to prevent harmful tax competition. 
Their first principle, which they label the ‘membership principle’, demands that natural 
persons and companies pay taxes in the state (or states) whose infrastructure and public goods 
they use. Dietsch and Rixen motivate this principle using the following example: Assume that 
there are two health clubs on the same street, an expensive one with high-end equipment and 
extensive services, and a cheaper, less fancy one. As it turns out, membership cards of the 
cheaper club let visitors pass the turnstile at the high-end club, too, and a large number of 
costumers of the high-end club avoid its higher fees by purchasing a membership card from 
the cheaper club. Would it be just to stop this practice? Of course it would, and much to the 
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same effect, Dietsch and Rixen argue, we should accept a principle that obliges individuals 
and companies to pay taxes where they actually live or operate. The hiding of portfolio capital 
in tax havens, as well as the practice of shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions by 
manipulating transfer prices, are thus impermissible (Dietsch and Rixen, 2014b: 157-161). 
While the membership principle prohibits practices of ‘poaching’ (that is, attracting tax base 
that is moved purely on paper), Dietsch and Rixen’s second principle bans some (though not 
all) forms of ‘luring’ (attracting tax base where this correlates with a real relocation of 
business activities or residence). The second principle is a fiscal policy constraint that consists 
of two parts (Dietsch and Rixen, 2014b: 161-166). A tax policy is prohibited if it (a.) 
diminishes the aggregate extent of fiscal self-determination internationally (‘outcomes 
component’), and (b.) is motivated by strategic considerations in the sense that the policy 
would not be adopted if it weren’t for the additional tax base that it attracts from abroad 
(‘intentions component’).  
The outcomes component makes sure that a tax policy is still allowed, even if it is motivated 
by strategic considerations, if it has positive or neutral consequences on fiscal self-
determination internationally. The intentions component is motivated by the thought that there 
is nothing wrong with states choosing low tax rates for non-strategic reasons. For example, if 
the English have a preference for a smaller state and less redistribution than the Swedish, 
Dietsch and Rixen (2014b: 162) see no justification for interfering with that choice on 
internationalist grounds. (I will challenge this assumption in the next section.) 
Both the membership principle and the fiscal policy constraint are to be enforced by an 
International Tax Organization (ITO) with a dispute settlement body similar to the one 
currently in place in the World Trade Organization (Dietsch and Rixen, 2014b: 166-170). 
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5. Three objections against the fiscal policy constraint 
I believe that we should accept something along the lines of the membership principle, and if 
it were observed universally, some of the most harmful practices of tax evasion and tax 
avoidance would be eliminated. But as Dietsch and Rixen (2014b: 160-161) note, doing away 
with profit shifting may result in higher levels of real business relocation. The membership 
principle does not solve the externality problem described by the Zodrow/Mieszkowski model 
of capital tax competition introduced in section 2. Rather, it moves us from a situation that is 
worse than what is described by the model to the externality problem the model depicts. 
Individual states are still faced with an (asymmetric) prisoner’s dilemma, where individual 
jurisdictions have an incentive to lower tax rates, even though higher rates would be better for 
all (or all could be made better off if side-payments were possible). It is Dietsch and Rixen’s’ 
solution to this problem that I find less convincing for three interrelated reasons.  
First, there is the problem of identifying strategic intentions. How should we decide in 
practice whether a specific change in the tax code is motivated by strategic considerations? 
Dietsch and Rixen (2014b: 168-169) discuss this problem in terms of the potential for 
hypocritical misrepresentations of a government’s actual motives. In response, they suggest to 
rely as much as possible on observable implications of a country’s intentions, much like this 
is currently done in the case of non-tariff trade barriers under WTO regulations. Non-tariff 
trade barriers are generally prohibited, except if they are put in place to protect consumer 
safety and health. Governments may be asked to prove their good intentions by presenting 
scientific evidence that the policy in question does indeed serve these goals. A similar 
solution, Dietsch and Rixen argue, may be used to operationalize the fiscal policy constrain.  
I do not find this analogy entirely convincing. In the WTO case, the approach is one of white 
listing, with permissible intentions relying on a relationship between a means (the trade 
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barrier) and an end (consumer safety or health). An objective test is possible because this 
means-end relation may or may not hold up to scrutiny. In the tax case, by contrast, the 
approach is one of black listing. All intentions except for strategic ones are permissible. 
Permissible motives may thus include non-instrumental considerations. For instance, a 
government might claim that it simply finds lower tax rates more just, because the rich have 
too much of a tax burden to carry already. In this case, there is no means-end relation to rely 
on in designing an objective test.  
Also, the problem may run deeper than merely exposing hypocritical misrepresentations of 
real intentions, for the ascription of a unitary intention to the complex array of agents 
involved in the making of tax law may itself be problematic (Risse and Meyer, 2016). For 
example, what counts as the intention of a parliament that decides on tax cuts, if some of its 
members have a non-strategic preference for low taxes, while others primarily want to attract 
foreign capital? What about a situation where individual citizens strategically vote principled 
low-tax politicians into office in order to evade the fiscal policy constraint and enable low-tax 
policies (which these citizens themselves favor for strategic reasons)? 
A second objection concerns the fact that the fiscal policy constraint seems to exhibit a 
problematic status quo bias. At least this is the case if the constraint is applied to changes in 
the tax code, as Dietsch and Rixen (2014b: 164, 168) seem to suggest when they talk about its 
operationalization. If so, starting to apply the constraint at any given time will give an unfair 
advantage to those jurisdictions that already have measures to attract foreign capital in place. 
Not only are they under no obligation to change their tax code, but the fiscal policy constraint 
also protects them from competition by new low-tax jurisdictions. Besides inviting fairness 
objections, this status quo bias will likely lead to increased strategic behavior in the run-up to 
an agreement to implement the fiscal policy constraint. 
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To avoid this problem, we might favor an alternative interpretation of the fiscal policy 
constraint. On this wider interpretation, states would be obliged to change any standing 
policies that deviate from the policies that would be in place if strategic considerations played 
no role in political deliberation (except where deviations from the non-strategic baseline have 
a beneficial or neutral effect on effective fiscal self-determination internationally). While this 
wider interpretation avoids the problem of status quo bias, it amplifies the problem of 
identifying strategic intentions. To decide whether a policy violates the constraint, we now 
need a full specification of the tax policies a country would presently have if strategic 
considerations had never played a role. Given the path dependence of developments in tax 
policy (the choices of a non-strategically motivated agent today presumably depend on the 
policies adapted earlier on), this necessitates rather sophisticated exercises in alternate history. 
We would need to go back in time to the point where arguments about tax competition first 
entered political debates and make judgements about what would have happened, until today, 
if these arguments had never been made. 
Third and most importantly, there is the problem of asymmetrical restraint. The intentions 
component makes the fiscal policy constraint a version of the ‘doctrine of double effect’ 
(Risse and Meyer, 2016). Adopting one and the same policy, in full knowledge of its 
consequences, will be either permissible or impermissible depending on whether these 
consequences are intended or merely foreseen. Let us assume that in one country taxes on 
capital are lowered by right libertarians who believe that owners have too much of tax burden 
to carry already, while in another country, the same policy is enacted by social democrats who 
think that, while a higher tax rate would be warranted in an ideal world, a lower rate is needed 
in the real world to attract capital. Should we say that the policy in question should be allowed 
in the first case but not in the second, because the inflow of capital from abroad was merely 
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foreseen in the first case, while it was intended in the second? Dietsch and Rixen (2014b: 
162) think so. If we are to remain neutral between different tax policy preferences and 
corresponding substantive theories of distributive justice, they argue, we have to accept low-
tax policies as long as they are chosen for non-strategic reasons (cf. Rixen, 2018: 119). 
However, this line of argument has awkward implications. Note that the fiscal policy 
constraint bans not only proactive but also reactive strategic behavior. Assume that the 
libertarian country has non-strategically lowered its taxes on capital, thus attracting tax base 
from the social democratic country. If social democrats now want to make up for some of 
their losses by enacting a moderate tax cut, the libertarians will have a case against them 
before the ITO’s dispute settlement body, even if the net flow of tax base is still from the 
social democratic country to the libertarian one.  
To make things worse, it may well turn out that the fiscal policy constraint does nothing to 
stop countries with a principled preference for low tax rates from approximating, in the long 
run, the policies they would adopt if strategic tax competition were allowed. While they are 
not allowed to take into account the expected influx of capital before it happens, the fiscal 
policy constraint still allows them to adjust their tax rates non-strategically after gaining 
additional tax base.  
To illustrate the point, consider a stylized two-country scenario with ‘England’ (with a 
preference for low taxes) and ‘Sweden’ (with a preference for higher taxes), both starting off 
with the same tax scheme (cf. Dietsch and Rixen, 2014b: 162). At t1, in accordance with their 
respective non-strategic preferences, England lowers its tax rate on capital, while Sweden 
raises capital taxation. Some capital from Sweden flows into the English economy. This is not 
the end of the story, however, for it seems plausible that tax preferences are not preferences 
for a fixed tax rate. Rather, they are preferences for a certain tax rate, given a certain size of 
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the tax base. Now assume that the preferred tax rate depends negatively on the amount of 
capital in the economy.7 At t2, England readjusts its rate of capital taxation. Given that the tax 
base is now larger, a somewhat lower tax rate will suffice to finance public expenditure at 
England’s preferred level. Sweden, on the other hand, will be forced to raise their tax rate 
even higher, regardless of the fact that they will lose even more capital to England.8 In the 
long run, England’s non-strategic choices will iteratively approximate the tax policies the 
country would adopt if it were allowed to choose strategically. The Swedish, on the other 
hand, will be forced to move ever further away from the policies they would choose in a 
strategic scenario: Every time the country loses some of its tax base, it is forced to choose an 
even higher tax rate. 
Perhaps one might think that these implications, awkward as they might seem, are simply the 
price we have to pay if we are to remain neutral between different substantive conceptions of 
distributive justice. In fairness, it should be noted that Dietsch and Rixen’s claim is not that a 
more robust institutional mechanism to prevent harmful tax competition (such as the 
introduction of minimum tax rates) is unjustifiable full stop.9 Rather, their claim is that such a 
regime cannot be justified on the minimalist normative premises from which they proceed. If 
we are committed to a substantive theory of justice that favors relatively high tax rates, we 
may criticize low-tax policies even if they are chosen for non-strategic reasons. But if we 
abstain from such substantive premises and limit ourselves to the internationalist motive of 
protecting effective fiscal self-determination, there is no justification for interfering with 
countries that act on a genuine preference for low tax rates (Dietsch and Rixen, 2014b: 162; 
Dietsch, 2016: 244-245; Rixen, 2018: 119).  
I disagree. Even if we treat tax preferences like any other morally neutral preferences, it is all 
but clear why we should favor a preference-dependent rule of conduct (where what you may 
  17 
do depends on your non-strategic preferences) over preference-independent rules of conduct 
(where everybody is subject to the same constraints). 
To see why, imagine a system of noise control that is roughly analogous to the fiscal policy 
constraint. Individuals would have a right to play music at whatever volume and time they 
wish, as long as this reflects their genuine preferences. However, to avoid an escalation of the 
noise level in public parks and densely populated areas, there would be a ban on strategically 
adapting to the noise created by other people. If you really prefer listening to music at a low 
volume but cannot hear your own stereo because of the loud music coming through from your 
neighbor’s place, you may not turn up the volume. 
I take it that this would hardly count as a fair way of dealing with the fact that preferences for 
loud music and preferences for silence cannot be fully satisfied at the same time. Nor would 
such regulation have the virtue of being particularly neutral between different preferences. 
Rather, this asymmetrical restraint regime of noise control may be criticized as being unfair 
for two distinct reasons. First, strategic adaptors may rightly object that they are unfairly 
disadvantaged in comparison to those with a genuine preference for loud music: Not only is 
their first-best preference (listening to their own music at a low volume) not fulfilled, but they 
are also prevented from realizing their second-best preference (listening to their own music at 
a higher volume, rather than hearing their neighbor’s). After all, strategic adaptors might say, 
they do genuinely prefer turning up the volume under the circumstances of a loud 
environment. Why should they not be allowed the same level of noise emission as those with 
a non-strategic preference for loud music? Second, silence lovers might object that the system 
does not take their interests into account sufficiently. After all, they are negatively impacted 
by loud music even in non-strategic cases. Rather than striking a fair balance, the rule under 
considerations simply lets music lovers have it their way as long as they follow their non-
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strategic preferences. Note that neither of these complaints depends in any way on there being 
a principled objection to loud music. The objections can be cashed out entirely in terms of an 
unequal satisfaction of preferences under a system of asymmetrical restraint. 
Similar objections can be raised against the fiscal policy constraint. First, strategic adaptors 
may rightly object to the asymmetrical constraint imposed on their option space. Why should 
they be obliged to refrain from enacting low-tax policies, given that they prefer these policies 
under the circumstances and other countries are allowed to enact them? Second, low-tax 
policies negatively impact countries with high-tax preferences regardless of whether they are 
chosen for strategic reasons. Granting one country the right to act on its non-strategic 
preference for very low tax rates will therefore limit the ability of other countries to act on 
their genuine preferences for a larger public budget and more redistributive policies. In other 
words, there is a conflict here between the claims of different countries to effective self-
determination, and there is no reason to believe that a fair solution, in such a situation, is to 
adjudicate this conflict in favor of the country with low-tax preferences. Again, these 
criticisms do not depend on a principled case against low-tax preferences based on a 
substantive theory of distributive justice. 
I do not want to claim that there is a full analogy between the noise case and the tax case. But 
both cases share an important structural feature. Loud music and low taxes both impose 
negative externalities on those with different preferences, but not vice versa (if anything, the 
silence of others helps music lovers realize their preferences, and high tax rates in other 
countries help low-tax jurisdictions realize their policy goals). If we discount the possibility of 
full sound-proofing, it is impossible to fully satisfy preferences for silence and preferences for 
loud music at the same time. Similarly, if we discount the possibility of immobilizing the tax 
base (e.g. by reintroducing capital controls), there is no way low-tax preferences and high-tax 
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preferences can be fully satisfied simultaneously. A fair solution will have to strike some kind 
of balance between both kinds of preferences.  
In conclusion, even if we assume that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with a preference 
for low tax rates, that there are uniform preferences among the citizens of a state and that 
governments trace these interests perfectly, it is far from clear that there should be an 
unlimited right to low tax rates. 
 
6. A more robust solution 
If my arguments so far are convincing, we should reject Dietsch and Rixen’s preference-
dependent fiscal policy constraint in favor of a more robust, preference-independent 
mechanism to limit downward pressure on the taxation of mobile tax bases. This more robust 
mechanism will also be targeted at a broader problem: It will not only address the harmful 
effects of tax competition in the strict sense (where countries act strategically to attract tax 
base), but it will address the broader externality problem created by uncoordinated tax setting 
under conditions of (partial) factor mobility, which persists even in the absence of strategic 
behavior. 
What could such a more robust mechanism look like? The most radical solution would 
certainly be to centralize the power to raise taxes on mobile tax bases in the hands of an 
international institution. From a cosmopolitan point of view, this is presumably an attractive 
solution, at least if we set aside concerns about institutionalization and the concentration of 
power. If the problem of the current tax regime is that it results in an unjust distribution 
between individuals worldwide, then global taxation (combined with a global system of 
transfers) is an obvious response. From an internationalist perspective, however, this solution 
would amount to throwing the baby out with the bathwater. If the negative externalities 
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created by low-tax policies are problematic because they undermine effective fiscal self-
determination, then getting rid of fiscal self-determination entirely will hardly count as an 
attractive solution. 
A somewhat more moderate solution, then, might be a mixed system that leaves the power to 
raise taxes on mobile tax bases with individual states, but introduces an additional layer of 
taxes and/or subsidies, to be raised and distributed by an international institution, which aims 
at internalizing the external effects of national tax policies. The general idea of such a system 
would be to disincentivize tax cuts at a rate that is equal, at the margins, to the costs these tax 
cuts create for other jurisdictions. Conversely, an increase in national tax rates would be 
incentivized, with the marginal size of the incentive equal to the marginal benefit all other 
states receive from the resulting influx of capital.10  
This would be an elegant solution, because states would remain free to set tax rates at 
whatever level they wish, as long as they are willing to bear the costs this choice imposes on 
other states. But whatever its merits, such an internalization mechanism is presumably far 
beyond what is politically feasible. First, it presupposes an international institution with the 
power to tax, which seems like a remote possibility at best. Second, there is a myriad of ways 
to implement such a system, each with a different impact on global distribution, and it would 
be very difficult to reach agreement on one specific implementation.11 I will therefore not 
pursue this internalization mechanism any further here. 
Instead, in the remainder of this paper, I will defend a simpler mechanism to mitigate 
downward pressure on the taxation of mobile tax bases: the introduction of internationally 
binding minimum tax rates (cf. Ronzoni, 2016: 211-212). This mechanism would leave the 
power to tax in the hands of individual states. However, tax rates below a commonly defined 
threshold would be prohibited. Compliance would have to be enforced by an international 
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institution with sufficient means do deter defection. The most obvious application would be a 
minimum tax rate on corporate income, though given the mobility of wealthy individuals and 
top earners, the same principle could also be applied to taxes on property or inheritances, or 
the highest bracket of personal income taxation. 
In comparison to the internalization solution, minimum tax rates may be seen as suboptimal in 
two ways. First, states will be unable to maintain tax rates below the threshold, even if they 
are willing to pay fully for the external costs of their choices. Second, harmful tax 
competition may persist on a smaller scale beyond the threshold. Nevertheless, a minimum 
tax rate that balances these two sources of suboptimality will likely mitigate the harmful 
effects of international tax competition substantially. Importantly, tax competition above the 
threshold is not unaffected by the existence of a minimum tax rate (Keen and Konrad, 2013: 
288-292). States that had a tax rate just above the threshold before the introduction of a 
minimum tax rate will now feel less pressure from states with very low tax rates and adjust 
their own tax rate accordingly. This, in turn, will decrease pressure on states with higher tax 
rates. 
Admittedly, there are feasibility questions about this solution, too. Saying that chances for the 
implementation of global minimum tax rates are currently slim is probably an understatement. 
Even within the European Union, where fiscal interdependence is arguably most pronounced 
due to the single market, little progress has been made so far to tackle harmful tax 
competition, partly because low-tax jurisdictions that benefit from the lack of coordination 
can block regulation under the EU’s unanimity rule (Wasserfallen, 2014). There is currently 
no common definition of the tax base, which is a prerequisite not only for effective minimum 
tax rates, but also for an implementation of the membership principle in the form of unitary 
taxation with formulary apportionment (cf. Dietsch and Rixen 2014b: 167-168). However, 
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both the European Commission (2016) and European Parliament (2018) still push for a 
common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) within the EU, and demands for a 
minimum tax rate on this commonly defined tax base come up now and again in the debate 
surrounding CCCTB. Most recently, the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs 
has called for a minimum tax rate of 25% on corporate income within the EU (European 
Parliament Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, 2018).12 While it is unlikely that 
such a minimum tax rate will be enacted anytime soon, it is not entirely outside the realm of 
political possibility, and it is at least conceivable that such a European solution could later be 
scaled to a more encompassing international framework. 
Another (perhaps more problematic) route towards global minimum tax rates would be to rely 
on unilateral measures by economically powerful jurisdictions. One proposal of this kind was 
put forward by former U.S. senator Max Baucus in 2013. The Baucus plan would have set a 
minimum tax rate on the income of U.S. corporations’ foreign subsidiaries at either 80% or 
60% of the U.S. tax rate, regardless of whether profits are repatriated. The plan would have 
disincentivized foreign tax rates below the minimum by levying a tax in the U.S. to make up 
for any difference to the minimum tax rate (Christians, 2013; Dietsch, 2015: 70-75). 
In sum, I believe that global minimum tax rates are not entirely infeasible in the long run. And 
they are a measure both cosmopolitans and internationalists have reason to support. Of 
course, theorists in both camps will disagree about the ultimate justification of minimum tax 
rates. Cosmopolitans will point to their positive impact on global distributive justice, while 
internationalists will see them as a circumscription of de jure sovereignty in the interest of 
protecting de facto sovereignty. Also, cosmopolitans will likely be in favor of a more 
encompassing reform of the global tax regime if that proves feasible at some point in the 
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future. But I think that cosmopolitans and internationalists can both agree that internationally 
binding minimum tax rates would be a step in the right direction. 
 
7. Setting the global minimum tax rate 
At what level, then, should the minimum tax rate on a given mobile tax base be set? To give a 
precise response to this question, we would need not only a wealth of empirical information, 
but also a full-fledged (cosmopolitan or internationalist) theory of justice, both of which I 
cannot provide here. Instead, I will limit myself to some remarks on how we might go about 
setting the minimum tax rate, thus addressing the worry familiar from the debate about 
sufficientarianism that any threshold will necessarily be arbitrary (Casal, 2007). 
From a cosmopolitan perspective, the relevant question is about the distribution of basic 
goods (or welfare, or any other currency of justice) among individuals. We should choose the 
minimum tax rate that leads to a global distribution that satisfies the preferred principle of 
justice. This may be a sufficientarian principle (what minimum tax rate enables all states to 
guarantee a certain social minimum to their inhabitants?), it may be a global difference 
principle (what minimum tax rate maximizes the holdings of the worst-off globally?) or any 
other principle of global distributive justice. Determining the preferred minimum tax rate on 
any of these theories will obviously be a difficult empirical task, but the normative basis for 
setting the minimum is relatively straightforward. 
From an internationalist perspective, on the other hand, the minimum tax rate should be 
chosen with an eye to its effects on the effective fiscal self-determination of states.13 There are 
two theoretical questions about this choice. First, how exactly should we understand fiscal 
self-determination, and how can it be measured in practice? Second, how should we choose 
between different distributions of fiscal self-determination among states? 
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Let us start with the measurement question. In the literature, effective fiscal self-
determination is typically understood to be a function of the choices available to a country 
regarding two broad characteristics of its economy, namely the size of its public sector and 
the distribution of burdens and benefits among individuals within the country (Dietsch and 
Rixen, 2014b: 153; Dietsch, 2015: 35; Ronzoni, 2014: 42-43; van Apeldoorn, 2018: 481-482). 
The greater a country’s ability to effectively affect these parameters through its policy 
choices, the greater its fiscal self-determination. 
There is an interesting question about whether these factors should be understood in relative 
or in absolute terms. Does a state’s effective fiscal self-determination depend on how well it 
can affect the size of its public budget relative to GDP, or do wealthier states enjoy a higher 
level of effective self-determination, because they can reach higher levels of public spending 
in absolute terms? Is a state’s ability to affect distribution to be measured in terms of its 
control over relative inequality (as measured, for example, by the Gini coefficient), or in 
terms of the absolute level of economic welfare it can provide to those at the bottom of the 
distribution?  
Most internationalists seem to endorse a relative understanding (e.g. Dietsch, 2015: 35; van 
Apeldoorn, 2018: 481-482). At first sight, this seems attractive because it allows us to isolate 
the issue of fiscal self-determination from issues of international distribution. At least in 
theory, a poor country could enjoy full fiscal self-determination in the relative sense. 
However, this relative understanding has awkward implications. Public spending relative to 
GDP could be increased simply by shrinking GDP while keeping public spending constant, 
and relative inequality could be reduced simply by making everybody poor. However, if a 
state is able to raise a large public budget relative to GDP only by drastically reducing GDP 
itself, or if it has the ability to reduce inequality only by making everybody worse-off, it 
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seems counterintuitive that this should count as a sign of a high level of effective fiscal self-
determination. (The charge against international tax competition is of course exactly that it 
creates this kind of situation. Strictly speaking, tax competition does not prevent countries 
from enacting redistributive policies or spending a large part of their GDP for public goods, it 
prevents them from doing so without losing capital and thereby shrinking their economy.) I 
take it, therefore, that we should favor an absolute understanding of effective fiscal self-
determination, which brings internationalism closer to cosmopolitanism in that it gives 
internationalists additional reason to worry about the international distribution of wealth. 
But let us put these issues aside and assume that we have a plausible measurement of a state’s 
ability to affect distribution and public sector size in place. How does a global minimum tax 
rate (say, on corporate income) affect this ability? To be sure, there is no one-to-one 
relationship between a state’s ability to raise tax revenue on one specific tax base and its 
ability to reach its policy goals regarding public sector size and redistribution. Rather, we 
have to assess how well a state can reach these goals using all the tools at its disposal, both on 
the tax side and on the spending side. But as I have argued above, it seems plausible that there 
is no perfect substitute for taxes on mobile tax bases. A country may substitute corporate 
income taxes with taxes on labor or consumption to finance the same public budget, but not 
without resorting to a more regressive policy mix overall.14 
There is, then, a relationship between fiscal self-determination and the option space available 
to a jurisdiction in taxing mobile tax bases. This option space may be represented using the 
so-called Laffer curve, which maps rates of taxation to corresponding levels of tax revenue.15 
A minimum tax rate takes away some options (all tax rates left of the minimum are off the 
table), while at the same time changing the shape of the Laffer curve right of the minimum 
(the jurisdiction will now be able to raise more revenue at higher tax rates).  
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Each level of minimum taxation will result in a different Laffer curve, and the question is 
which of these option spaces gives the state in question the most fiscal self-determination 
overall. At first approximation, we might ask which minimum tax rate offers the single best 
policy option to a jurisdiction, in terms of best fulfilling its preferences for redistribution and 
the provision of public goods. But internationalists are concerned not so much with optimality 
as with choice. If a country had only one policy option, which accidentally fulfilled its 
preferences perfectly, it would plausibly enjoy very limited self-determination.16 This means 
that we should not limit ourselves to looking at one single set of preferences, but instead 
evaluate how well a jurisdiction can fulfil different tax preferences under any given minimum 
tax rate. Ideally, we need an index of fiscal self-determination that allows us to reduce the 
whole option space to a single value, and I have no comprehensive response to how we might 
go about constructing such an index. But it seems obvious that any plausible 
operationalization of the notion of effective fiscal self-determination will be concerned not 
merely with the number of options available to a jurisdiction, but also with their value. As 
Dietsch (2016: 244) puts it, ‘[t]he formal liberty of choosing your tax rate becomes 
meaningless if choosing a high rate will result in capital outflows that seriously dent 
revenues’. While it is obviously true that the number of options decreases with any increase of 
the minimum tax rate, this will be offset, for some levels of minimum taxation, by the fact 
that the remaining options become more valuable. Up to a certain point, the circumscription 
of de jure sovereignty will enhance a jurisdiction’s de facto sovereignty. 
Where exactly this tipping point is situated will depend on a number of factors, including the 
size of the economy in question and other country specific characteristics. Therefore, there 
will likely be a range in which an increase in the global minimum tax rate will enhance the 
effective sovereignty of some states while at the same time diminishing the effective 
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sovereignty of others. This leads us to the second question: How should we choose between 
different distributions of effective fiscal self-determination among states?  
Much like cosmopolitans disagree about the preferred distributive pattern among individuals, 
so internationalists could defend different principles for a just distribution of effective fiscal 
self-determination among states (van Apeldoorn, 2018). They could be sufficientarians (each 
jurisdiction should enjoy a certain minimum level of effective self-determination) or strict 
egalitarians (equal self-determination for all), they could be concerned with raising the 
effective self-determination of the worst-off jurisdiction, or they could be sum-maximizers 
(endorsing the view that we should maximize the total amount of effective fiscal self-
determination enjoyed by all states).17 
Which of these versions of internationalism we should favor is up for debate, as is the 
preferred measurement of effective fiscal self-determination. But it is important to note that 
these problems are not specific to the policy proposal at hand. They also come up in the 
operationalization of the Dietsch/Rixen solution,18 and more generally, internationalists who 
want to evaluate any regime of global tax governance will likely need a response to these 
questions. 
While I have not been able to devise a precise response to how high the minimum tax rate 
should be, I hope to have shown that it need not be arbitrary. Once we have a fully specified 
theory of justice on either cosmopolitan or internationalist grounds, determining the preferred 
level of minimum taxation will be an empirical task. If my considerations are convincing, this 
preferred level will not be zero on either account. 
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8. Accommodating the needs of low-income countries 
Let us now turn to the worry that global minimum tax rates may end up harming those 
countries that are already among the worst-off globally. If competition for mobile capital on 
the basis of low tax rates is limited, other location factors such as public infrastructure or the 
education level of the workforce will likely gain in importance. Countries that do not have 
much to offer in this regard will be left with little or no possibility to attract foreign direct 
investment. And without capital flowing into the jurisdiction, they may not be able to raise the 
tax revenue necessary to improve public infrastructure or education. Should we exempt low-
income countries from global minimum tax rates to create a pathway out of this trap? 
If there were only one low-income country in the world, a blanket exception would probably 
be a defensible solution. This country would likely choose a tax rate somewhat lower than the 
minimum for all other countries, but it would still be able to raise substantial tax revenue on 
the inflowing capital. However, in the real world there is more than one low-income country. 
If a blanket exception is made for all of them, a race to the bottom among them would be the 
likely effect, leaving them unable to raise enough tax revenue to finance much needed public 
investments. 
A preferable solution, therefore, would be one that involves a direct redistribution of financial 
means (Dietsch and Rixen, 2014b: 166), which could be used to improve education and public 
infrastructure. If this first-best solution is not feasible, maybe a differentiated system with two 
different minimum tax rates, a lower one for low-income countries and a higher one for 
everyone else, may be an acceptable second-best solution. But a blanket exception would not 
only be costly for higher-income countries, it would also hardly serve the interests of low-
income countries themselves. 
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9. Conclusion 
Dietsch and Rixen are to be credited not only with substantiating Ronzoni’s (2009) earlier 
claim that tax competition undermines international background justice, but also with coming 
up with a plausible normative solution to the problems associated with offshore tax havens 
and profit shifting. What is less convincing, this paper argued, is the fiscal policy constraint 
they propose to limit downward pressure on capital taxation caused by competition for 
foreign direct investment. Instead, both cosmopolitans and internationalists should lobby for 
the introduction of global minimum tax rates on mobile tax bases. Theorists in both camps 
may disagree about the direction global tax governance should take in the long run. 
Internationalists will want to protect the fiscal self-determination of states, while 
cosmopolitans may want to move away from a state-centered system altogether. In the 
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2 For a discussion of problems concerning the definition and measurement of effective fiscal 
self-determination, see section 7. 
3 Notable exceptions include the models by Slemrod and Wilson (2009) and Hong and Smart 
(2010), which account for income shifting to tax havens. 
4 The furniture retailer IKEA is an instructive example (Auerbach, 2016): All national IKEA 
Group subsidiaries pays a fee for using the IKEA brand to Inter IKEA Systems BV, located in 
the Netherlands. This lowers IKEA’s taxable profits in other countries. However, these profits 
are not taxed in the Netherlands, either. Until 2011, most revenue of Inter IKEA Systems BV 
was passed on to an undisclosed entity, presumably in a tax haven. In 2012, the Interogo 
Foundation in Liechtenstein sold the IKEA trademark to Inter IKEA Systems BV, so that in 
theory, profits on the trademark would now be taxable in the Netherlands. However, the sale 
of the trademark was financed by a € 5.4 billion loan, leading to tax-deductible interest 
payments from Inter IKEA Systems BV in the Netherlands to Interogo Finance SA in 
Luxembourg, which paid an effective tax rate of just 0.06% between 2012 and 2014, while 
sending € 807.8 million in dividends to Interogo Foundation in Liechtenstein. 
5 Tax competition optimists sometimes point out that despite declining statutory tax rates, 
corporate tax revenue as a percentage of GDP has remained stable or even increased since the 
1980s in many OECD countries (OECD, 2019). However, there is evidence that effective 
corporate tax rates have indeed dropped, and that stable or increasing tax revenues are the 
result of higher corporate profits offsetting the downward pressure on corporate taxation 
(Clausing, 2016). 
6 On the kind of internationalism I am concerned with here, the scope of background justice 
includes all states that are in a position to dominate each other or undermine each other’s 
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effective sovereignty. On the argument under consideration, this includes all states between 
which capital is mobile. 
7 This may be the case for a number of reasons. First, a country’s preference might take the 
sufficientarian form of a preference for a fixed level of basic provision. The larger the tax 
base, the lower the tax rate necessary to finance this basic provision. Second, the influx of 
capital might have effects in the private sector (such as lowering unemployment), which in 
turn decrease the preferred level of taxation (e.g. to finance unemployment benefits). Third, 
even if the preference is one for a tax revenue in the amount of a fixed percentage of GDP, 
there may be a negative correlation between tax base and preferred tax rate based on declining 
returns of capital. Note that my argument does not presuppose that there is always a negative 
correlation between the amount of capital in an economy and the preferred rate of capital 
taxation. It is enough that the correlation may plausibly be negative in some cases. 
8 The example assumes the wider interpretation of the fiscal policy constraint as discussed 
above. On the narrower interpretation, the Swedish will be allowed to stick with their standing 
policies, though the point about England’s right to iteratively move to more aggressive low-
tax policies still stands. 
9 Rixen (2011: 460) even argues in favor of minimum tax rates in other work that is less 
concerned with neutrality vis-à-vis different distributive preferences. 
10 The same incentives could be realized using only taxes (the revenue of which would be 
spent in some other way), only subsidies (to be financed with some independent stream of 
revenue), or by a revenue-neutral combination of both. Wildasin (1989) proposes a subsidy 
model in the context of capital tax competition between U.S. states. He estimates that the 
marginal size of the subsidy should be up to 40% in a situation of perfect capital mobility. In 
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other words, one dollar of additional tax revenue generated locally from an increase in capital 
taxation should be matched with a 40 cent national subsidy in order to offset externalities. 
11 There are different ways to implement such a system because the same marginal incentives 
can be realized by imposing different overall costs and benefits. As long as the marginal cost 
the system imposes on a jurisdiction for a tax cut equals the marginal negative externality this 
tax cut imposes on other jurisdictions, it does not matter, in terms of incentives, whether the 
state in question is a net beneficiary or a net payer. 
12 Also see ‘Our manifesto for Europe’ (Piketty et al., 2014), which calls for a 20% minimum 
tax rate on corporate income in Europe and an additional 10% to be raised directly at the 
European level.  
13 Additionally, internationalists may also be interested in the impact of the minimum tax rate 
on inter-state inequality. As I will show below, this distributive concern can be integrated at 
least partly into the concern for effective fiscal self-determination: The minimum tax rate 
should be chosen with an eye to its effects on the distribution of fiscal self-determination 
among states. However, internationalists may also want to give some direct weight to the 
impact of the minimum tax rate on economic inequalities between states. 
14 Other forms of capital taxation such as personal capital income taxes, property taxes or 
inheritance taxes may be a closer substitute for corporate income taxes in terms of their 
impact on distribution, but those are subject to downward pressure from international tax 
competition, too. 
15 The Laffer curve was originally used to illustrate an argument that high tax rates are 
counterproductive because, beyond a certain point, an increase in the tax rate will lead to 
lower tax revenue due to incentive effects. Many economists today doubt that tax rates right 
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of this tipping point are ever observed in practice. My use of the Laffer curve does not depend 
on this assumption and is not meant as an endorsement of Laffer’s larger argument. 
16 Ronzoni (2014: 43) captures this by adding a third aspect to her definition of effective fiscal 
self-determination. To be fiscally self-determining, on her view, a state needs not only the 
capacity to maintain the desired level of public budget and redistribution, but also flexibility 
in its fiscal policies over time. An alternative (and in my view preferable) understanding 
incorporates the concern for flexibility into the way we understand the first two aspects: not 
as the ability to maintain one specific level of public budget and redistribution, but as the 
ability to choose between different levels of public budget and redistribution. 
17 Van Apeldoorn (2018) discusses sufficientarian and egalitarian versions of 
internationalism. Dietsch and Rixen (2014b) seem to endorse a sum-maximizing view when 
they argue that strategically motivated tax policies should be prohibited if they reduce the 
aggregate extent of fiscal self-determination internationally. 
18 Remember that the fiscal policy constraint prohibits strategic tax policies only if they are 
harmful to effective fiscal sovereignty internationally. To apply this in practice, we need a 
measurement of effective fiscal sovereignty, and we need a distributive principle to deal with 
cases where a policy is beneficial to some states’ effective sovereignty but harmful to others’. 
